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Abstract
We introduce a heterogeneous connection model for network formation to capture
the effect of cost heterogeneity on the structure of efficient networks. In the proposed
model, connection costs are assumed to be separable, which means the total connection
cost for each agent is uniquely proportional to its degree. For these sets of networks,
we provide the analytical solution for the efficient network and discuss stability impli-
cations. We show that the efficient network exhibits a core-periphery structure, and for
a given density, we find a lower bound for clustering coefficient of the efficient network.
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1 Introduction
Network formation models are increasingly being used in a variety of economic contexts
and other multi-agent systems. These models often study the structural conditions of effi-
ciency, network social welfare, and stability, which is a measure of individual incentives to
form, keep or sever links
We build our model based on the Connection model proposed by Jackson and Wolinsky
(1996)1 in which agents can benefit from both direct and indirect connections, but only
pay for their direct connections. Benefits of indirect connections generally decrease with
distance. Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) demonstrated that, for the homogeneous case, the
efficient network can only take one of three forms: a complete graph, a star or an empty
graph depending on connection cost and benefits. Several models have been proposed to
introduce heterogeneity into the connection model, (see for instance: Galeotti et al. (2006);
Jackson and Rogers (2005); Persitz (2010); Vandenbossche and Demuynck (2013)); the focus
has mainly been on conditions for stability, with few references to efficiency. Finding general
analytical solutions for the efficient networks with heterogeneous costs can be intractable,
see for example Carayol and Roux (2009).
Here, we focus on finding efficient networks for a particular model of cost heterogeneity
that we refer to as the separable connection cost model, in which shares of nodes’ costs from
each connection are heterogeneous, yet fixed and independent of to whom they connect.
This is motivated by networks in which heterogeneous agents are each endowed with some
resources (time, energy, bandwidth, etc) and the total resource needed to establish and
maintain connections for each node can be approximated to be proportional to its degree.
We further assume homogeneous benefits decaying with distance. We provide an exact
analytical solution for efficient connectivity structures under these assumptions and show
1Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) developed their model based on the notion of pairwise stability or two-
sided link formation where a link is formed upon the “mutual consent” of two agents. There is also another
line of literature from Bala and Goyal (1997); Goyal (1993) that studies one-sided and non-cooperative link
formation, where agents unilaterally decide to form the links with another agent.
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that such networks have at most one connected component, exhibit a core-periphery structure
and have diameters no larger than two. We further provide a lower bound for the clustering
coefficient and discuss the pairwise stability implications of efficient networks.
2 Model
For n agents, let b : {1, ..., n− 1} → R represent the benefit that an agent receives from
(direct or indirect) connections to other agents as function of the distance between them in a
graph. Following Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), the (distance-based) utility function of each
node, ui(g), in a graph g and the total utility of the graph, U(g), are as follows:
ui(g) =
∑
j 6=i:j∈Nn−1(g)
b(dij(g))−
∑
j 6=i:j∈N(g)
cij
U(g) =
n∑
i=1
ui(g)
(1)
where dij(g) is the distance between i and j, cij is the cost that node i pays for connecting
to j, and b is the benefit that node i receives from a connection with another node in the
network. We assume that b(k) > b(k + 1) > 0 for any integer k ≥ 1.
The network g˜ is efficient, if U(g˜) ≥ U(g′) for all g′ ⊂ gN , which indicates that g˜ =
arg maxg
∑n
i=1 ui(g). Assuming the separable cost model as introduced earlier, connection
costs in Equation 1, for a link between i and j can be written as cij = ci, cji = cj. We then
introduce a connection cost vector, C, and without loss of generality rename nodes such that
c1 < c2 < ... < cn.
2.1 Efficient Structures under Separable Connection Costs
In Lemma 1, we determine the efficient structure for a connected component. Then in
Proposition 1, we determine the structure of the efficient network in general.
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Lemma 1 If the efficient network with separable cost model is connected then it has a “gen-
eralized star” structure with the following characteristics: (a) All nodes are connected to
node 1 ( the node with minimum connection cost). (b) Nodes i and j (i, j 6= 1) are connected
iff b(1)− b(2) > .5(ci + cj).
Proof. Let N represents nodes in the connected network. If there exists a subset of nodes
M = {v1, ..., vm} (M ⊂ N) that are not connected to node 1, we show that the network is
not efficient. Since N is connected, there exists a set of links, L = {l1, ..., lm} where li is
adjacent to vi
2. Suppose li connects vi to wi ( wi 6= 1 by definition). Now, if we remove all
lis and connect all vis to node 1, we have reduced the total connection cost of the network
by mc1 −
m∑
k=1
cvk < 0.
Now, to address the benefits, note that we have not changed the number of links; there-
fore direct benefits remain the same. Furthermore, the diameter of the new network is 2.
Therefore every distance that is not 1 is capped at 2, making the total benefit larger than
that of the original network. This results in at improvement in the total utility, indicating
that the original network was not efficient.
Furthermore, having established that the maximum distance in the efficient network is
no larger than two, every node i and j (i, j 6= 1) are connected iif b(1)− b(2) > .5(ci + cj).
Proposition 1 determines the structure of the efficient network and shows that the efficient
network is a spectrum of solutions.
Proposition 1 In the connection model, for a finite set of agents, N = {1, .., n}, if cij = ci
for all i, j ∈ N , where ci ∈ C = {c1, c2, ..., cn} and assuming, c1 < c2 < · · · < cn, the
structure of the efficient network is as follows: Let m be the largest integer between 1 and n
such that 2b(1) + 2(m− 2)b(2) > (cm + c1). If i > m, then i is isolated. If i ≤ m, then there
2For any subset M = {v1, · · · , vm} of a connected network N (M 6≡ N), we can show that there are
links L = {l1, · · · , lm} in N such that vi is adjacent to li.
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is exactly one link between i and 1; also there is one link between i and j (1 < i, j ≤ m) iff
b(1)− b(2) > .5(ci + cj).
Proof.
First, we show there is at most one connected component in the efficient network. Next,
we find the condition for each node to be in the connected component, which has the gener-
alized star structure according to Lemma 1.
Assume that the efficient network has more than one (e.g. two) connected components
with (mi, `i) being respectively the number of nodes and links in connected component
i. According to Lemma 1, each connected component has a generalized star structure.
The total benefit of each component is B1 = 2`1b(1) + (m1(m1 − 1) − 2`1)b(2) and B2 =
2`2b(1)+(m2(m2−1)−2`2)b(2) respectively. Suppose h and h′ are nodes with minimum costs
in component 1 and 2 respectively and without loss of generality ch < ch′ . If we disconnect all
links connected to h′ and connect them directly to h, total cost decreases by (ch′−ch) per link.
This also results in the total benefit B = (`1+`2)b(1)+((m1+m2)(m1+m2−1)−2(`1+`2))b(2),
which is strictly greater than (B1 + B2).
To determine which nodes belong to the connected component, GC , in the efficient net-
work, we define, for node i, Ai , 2b(1) + 2(k − 2)b(2) − c1 − ci where k is the number of
nodes in the connected component GC . We show that i is in GC iff Ai ≥ 0. First, Ai > 0 is
the sufficient condition for i to be in GC . This is because connecting i to node 1 increases
the total utility by exactly Ai, as the diameter of GC is at most 2, according to Lemma 1.
Also if Ai < 0, then i will be isolated so Ai ≥ 0 is also the necessary condition. This is
because i cannot be only connected to 1 since Ai < 0, so the only way for i to be connected
is by having more than one link. From Lemma 1, for i to have a link to j 6= 1, we must have
ci + cj < 2b(1)− 2b(2). But: ci + cj > c1 + ci > 2b(1) + 2(k − 2)b(2) > 2b(1)− 2b(2), where
we use the fact that cj > c1 and Ai < 0, so i cannot have more than one connection either,
thus i will be isolated. Note that Ai > 0 also means Aj > 0 for all j < i since cj < ci, thus
all lower cost nodes will also be in GC , so the smallest i for which Ai < 0 provides the size
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of the connected component in the efficient network.
2.2 Stability
Assuming heterogeneous, separable connection costs, are there structures that are simul-
taneously efficient and stable? To investigate this, we use the notion of pairwise stability3.
According to Proposition 1, for a (pairwise) stable network to also be efficient, it has to have
a single connected component with a generalized star structure.
We demonstrate that there are pairwise stable networks in the form of a generalized star.
Such structures have one connected component with m′ nodes, where m′ is the largest integer
between 1 and n such that cm′ < b(1) + (m
′ − 2)b(2). With N ′ as the set of every node i
where ci ≤ b(1)− b(2), we show that for a stable network with a generalized star structure:
1) N ′ is a complete graph, 2) Any i ∈ N ′ can be the hub, h, and every j /∈ N ′ for which
b(1)− b(2) < cj < b(1) + (m′ − 2)b(2) is connected to the hub, h.
Given ci < b(1) − b(2), any two agents in N ′ benefit from forming a link, so N ′ is a
complete graph. No agent i ∈ N ′ has an incentive to sever any of its links (inside or outside
of N ′) as it pays ci < b(1)− b(2) per connection. Once all (e.g. m′) nodes are connected to
node h ∈ N ′, severing a link by j /∈ N ′ for which cj < b(1)+(m′−2)b(2) decreases its utility.
Moreover, there are no two agents j and j′ where j /∈ N ′ and j′ 6= h who can improve their
utilities by agreeing on forming a mutual link given cj > b(1)− b(2).
The described structure is not the only possible stable structure as one can in general
construct stable structures with diameters bigger than 2 4, nor does this structure ensure
efficiency. However for certain cost vectors we can create structures that are simultaneously
stable and efficient. For example, let C = {c1, . . . , ck, . . . , cm, . . . , cn}. Suppose we have
3According to Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), the network g is pairwise stable if:
(i) for all ij ∈ g, ui(g) ≥ ui(g − ij) and uj(g) ≥ uj(g − ij) and
(ii) for all ij ∈ g, if ui(g + ij) ≥ ui(g) then uj(g + ij) < uj(g).
4For instance, if n=4 and for each agent i, b(1)−b(3) < ci < b(1), a line structure is also a stable network
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k such that ck ≤ b(1) − b(2) and ck+1 > 2(b(1) − b(2)). Suppose we have m such that
cm < (m − 1)b(2) and cm+1 > b(1) + (m − 2)b(2). If all i ≤ k form a complete graph and
every j(k < j < m) is connected to node 1, the resulting network is both stable and efficient.
2.3 Characteristics of Networks with Separable Cost Model
2.3.1 Core-Periphery structure
We show that the efficient network has a Core-periphery structure, a widely observed
structure in various social and economic networks (i.e. see for example Zhang et al. (2014);
Rombach et al. (2014)). We adopt the formal definition from Bramoulle´ (2007), which
states that a graph g has a core-periphery structure when agents can be partitioned into
two sets, the core C and the periphery P , such that all partnerships are formed within the
core and no partnership is formed within the periphery. For an efficient network, let k be
the largest integer between 2 and n such that b(1) − b(2) > .5(ck−1 + ck). The efficient
network can be partitioned into a set C = {1, . . . , k}, which forms a complete subgraph and
a set P = {k + 1, . . . , n} which can only have connections to the complete subgraph. If
b(1) − b(2) > (ck−1 + ck) then k and k − 1 are connected and there is also a link between
every node i, j(i, j ≤ k and ci, cj ≤ ck), which forms a complete subgraph. Similarly, we can
show that for every i ∈ P , which is connected to a node j, cj ≤ ck and j 6∈ P .
2.3.2 Clustering coefficient
We find the global clustering coefficient of the efficient network and a lower bound for
it. For a given density, the following structure results in minimum clustering coefficient
for the connected component in the efficient network: Let m be the number of nodes and
`(` ≥ m−1) represent the number of links in the connected component. Having nodes sorted
according to connection costs and without violating the conditions for efficiency, we connect
every two nodes such that minimum number of triangles are made as follows: Starting from
node k = 1, we establish a link from node k to every node i > k. We repeat this process for
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k = 1, . . . , n until the total number of links reaches `. Therefore, we have ` =
∑p
k=1(n−k)+J
where J < n−p+1. At the k-th iteration, the total number of connected triplets is increased
by
(
n−k
2
)
+
(
J
2
)
and the total number of triangles is increased by (k−1)(n−k)+pJ . Therefore
we have 5 :
C(g) =
3× number of triangles
number of connected triplets of nodes
=
3× {∑pk=1(k − 1)(n− k) + pJ}∑p
k=1
(
n−k
2
)
+
(
J
2
)
≥ 3×
∑p
k=1(k − 1)(n− k)∑p
k=1
(
n−k
2
) (2)
3 Conclusion
Heterogeneous yet separable connection costs cover important classes of real networks.
We showed that efficient structures for such networks can be solved exactly and have diameter
no larger than two; we also discussed the transitivity and core-periphery nature of such
networks. Moreover, we showed the possibility of having simultaneous efficient and stable
structures for these classes of network under certain cost vectors and benefit functions.
Although benefits are still assumed to be homogeneous, one can easily take into account
heterogeneity of direct benefits, as long as the separability assumption is maintained, i.e.
cost and direct benefit terms appear together in all analysis and cost terms can capture
heterogeneity of direct benefits by embedding them as an off-set in the fixed costs of nodes.
There are cases where the separable cost assumption does not hold, for example when
the link cost is the function of how similar the two nodes are. These cases in general can
be intractable and approximate methods such as island models as discussed in Jackson and
Rogers (2005) can be used.
5For n ≥ 3 and with some algebra we can show the inequality.
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